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Abstract 
 
In literature, subnational governments have been identified as being prone to fiscal profligacy. In 
response to this problem, some countries choose to put a limit on the borrowing capacity of the state and 
local governments. This is notably the case for Malaysia with the enactment of Article 111 (12) of the 
Constitution. However it remains to be answered whether such regulation really has an impact on the 
spending behavior of the state governments. This paper attempts to shed some light on this question by 
employing the methodology usually found in the study of intertemporal behavior. The underlying 
objective is to examine whether a decision to further decentralize the economy in the future will 
not be translated into macroeconomic instability due to the fiscally irresponsible behavior of the 
state governments. Indeed such eventuality can be avoided if the federal government has what it 
takes in order to put the spending behavior of the state governments under control.  Our findings 
point to the conclusion that the regulation has failed to produce a significant effect on the spending 
behavior of the state governments. The results indicate that the state governments in Malaysia manage to 
observe a forward looking behavior implying that they are not subject to any liquidity constraint. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, subnational borrowings, institutional restriction, consumption 
smoothing. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, there has been an increasing interest in decentralization all around the 
world. Yet Malaysia seems to be oblivion to this decentralization wave. To date, there has been 
no major move made by the country in order to empower or to further develop the existing local 
and state governments. Instead, the federal government has, on various occasions, made an 
incursion on the functions of the states despite the clear division of powers and functions between 
the federal and state governments
1
. 
  
The Malaysian government's reluctance to espouse the decentralization process is not without 
costs to the country. There are strong arguments that the devolution of several powers of the 
federal government to local levels could enhance efficiency as the latter could be more 
responsive to variations in local needs and perhaps more accountable to those being served.  
However it is important to notify that all these positive impacts may not materialize if no efforts 
are made in controlling the spending behavior of subnational governments. It is virtually a 
conventional wisdom, at least among economists, that subnational governments are predisposed 
for fiscal profligacy. The latter if left unchecked will embark on a spending spree which at the 
end will jeopardize the stability of the economy as a whole.  
 
Malaysia is no exception. The risk of fiscal profligacy does exist in the country and the 
government tries to have a hold over this problem notably by the enactment in 1976 of the Article 
111 (2) of the Malaysian Constitution which avers that " A State shall not borrow except under 
the authority of State law, and State law shall not authorize a State to borrow except from the 
Federation or, for a period not exceeding five years, from a bank or other financial source 
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approved for that purpose by the Federal Government, and subject to such conditions as may be 
specified by the Federal Government".  
 
The regulation is rather strict in the sense that all borrowing by the state governments needs to go 
through the central government who will act like a filtering device. So in principle, borrowing for 
the purpose of financing activities or goods considered unwarrantable will be refused. States 
governments realizing that they will not get financing easily will become more close-fisted 
especially on unnecessary ventures. On the other hand, since there's no guarantee that only good 
projects will pass through and get financed as the central government may not have the capacity 
(or the willingness) to sieve all the projects submitted to them, state governments face weak 
incentives to be more fiscally responsible. In other words, this limitation may be regarded by the 
state governments as a mere veil with no consequence whatsoever on their spending behavior.  
 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the impact of this institutional control on the spending 
behavior of the 13 state governments in Malaysia. The underlying objective is to examine 
whether a decision to further decentralize the economy in the future will not be translated into 
macroeconomic instability due to fiscally irresponsible behavior of the state governments. Indeed 
such eventuality can be avoided if the federal government has what it takes in order to put the 
spending behavior of the state governments under control.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary on the 
relation between subnational governments and fiscal indiscipline. Section 3 looks at the role of 
institutional rules both theoretically and empirically. A description of the theoretical framework 
is provided in section 4. In section 5, we will discuss the data and empirical approach adopted. 
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The results of the estimation strategy are presented and discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
Subnational governments and fiscal indiscipline. 
In a multi-tiered government, the subnational governments have the possibility to overfish the 
common revenues by shifting their costs onto others. This problem known as the common pool 
problem arises from the fact that the opportunity cost of public revenues as perceived by 
subnational governments is lower than the true social cost. Indeed, the financial resources of 
subnational governments do not fully come from own-source revenues like local taxes, charges 
and borrowing. Instead, subnational governments rely (in some cases, heavily) on the 
intergovernmental grants to finance its activities. And the larger the vertical fiscal gap is, the 
more aggravated the problem of common pool will be: subnational governments will have every 
incentive to overspend when means of financing are mostly raised by the central government. 
 
The soft-budget constraint faced by state governments is another factor that explains why state 
governments are prone to fiscal profligacy. It refers to the fact that federal transfers to 
subnational governments are sometimes based on ex post financial needs and not, as it should be, 
on ex-ante characteristics of the recipient states. As such, subnational governments are not held to 
a fixed budget but find their budget constraint softened by the injection of additional credit (or 
guarantees) whenever they are on the verge of fiscal fiasco. In other words, it refers to the failure 
of the central government to credibly show its commitment not to come to help to states in 
financial distress. The soft budget constraint is aggravated by the existence of intergovernmental 
grants. When the central government is providing for a big chunk of the local and state 
government budget through the intergovernmental grants, it is very probable that, in the event of 
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fiscal crisis, residents (and creditors) of the subnational governments will turn to central 
government for a solution.  This is because a highly transfer-dependent local government, when 
faced with an adverse fiscal shock, may not have the flexibility to raise additional revenue and it 
may be forced to reduce the provision of basic public services, to default on loans or to rely on 
arrears on employees and contractors. Besides, the literature on "flypaper effects" shows that 
intergovernmental grants may spur new expenditure commitments or new public employees 
which are difficult to cut during downturns. Consequently, the high adjustment cost faced by the 
subnational government in time of distress makes it difficult for the central government to 
commit to the implicit or explicit ex-ante rule. As a result, subnational governments estimating 
that the central government will not be able to ignore their fiscal woes, face weak incentives to be 
fiscally responsible
2
. 
 
The role of institutional rules. 
In response to the fiscal indiscipline problem, various institutional approaches have been adopted 
that consist mainly in limiting the subnational governments' access to credit. Following Ter 
Minassian (1997), these approaches are usually grouped into 4 broad categories: Market 
discipline, rule-based control, administrative constraint and cooperative arrangement
3
. These 
rules are not mutually exclusives and most countries utilize a mix of them. The diversity in 
approaches adopted indicate among others, the legal or constitutional status of subnational 
governments, the degree of political and administrative controls of the central government over 
them, the country’s overall tradition of financial discipline, the presence or absence of serious 
fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances and the state of development of the country’s financial 
market.  
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A number of empirical studies have focused on the impact of these institutional controls on fiscal 
outcomes such as the local fiscal deficits or the level of subnational indebtedness. Yet the 
econometric evidence has so far been limited and mixed.  
 
In a sample of 30 countries, von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) found that the introduction of 
borrowing constraints has lead to increases in subnational indebtedness. However, this result is 
based on a regression that does not control for factors other than GDP. Fornasari, Webb, and Zou 
(2000), in a study on 31 countries, found that constraining subnational borrowing did not seem to 
have any consistent effect on subnational fiscal deficits. Jin and Zou (2002) found similar results 
in 32 countries for the size of subnational governments. These results comforted the view 
according to which these fiscal institutions are simply a veil that can easily be pierced by voters 
and their fiscal representatives (Poterba, 1995).  
 
On the contrary, empirical results found in some studies show that fiscal institutions have a 
potential to affect fiscal outcomes. A report by Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relation (ACIR) in 1987 shows that  an index of the stringency of the state’s balanced budget 
requirement to significantly reduce state deficits measured here by a general fund deficit. Alt and 
Lowery (1994), using a panel data set from 1968-87, found that Republican state facing a “no 
carry-over” balanced budget constraint are found to close more of the deficit gap than republican 
states without the “no carry-over” constraint. However, Democratic states with and without the 
“no carry-over” constraint behave similarly, closing the same deficit gap as the republican “no 
carry-over” states. Poterba (1994) found that states with strict anti deficit rules respond to a 
deficit shock by reducing spending and increasing tax more than do states with weak anti deficit 
rules. Using budget data from a panel of 47 states from the period of 1970-1991, Bohn and Inman 
 8 
(1994) estimates the responsiveness of state deficits to change in state income and found that an 
end-of-the-year (stricter) budget requirement have a positive effects on a state's general fund 
surplus. Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1999) found that an index of fiscal institutions 
that included a component measuring the existence of fiscal rules limiting the level of debt was 
negatively correlated with fiscal deficits in a sample of Latin American countries. Rodden (2002) 
in a study on a panel data of 33 countries, found that the largest deficits are run by subnational 
governments that rely heavily on federal transfers and at the same time are free to borrow.  
 
However, all these studies are plagued by a serious endogeneity problem. The correlation found 
between fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes may actually be the reflection of underlying 
voters' preferences. In fact, it is possible for states in which voters have preference for fiscal 
prudence tend to have lower fiscal deficits and to support a constitutional or legislative limit on 
subnational borrowing.  
 
The Malaysian case and the choice of methodology. 
In the case of Malaysia, it is clear from Article 111(12) of the Constitution that the state 
governments cannot make any borrowings without the federal government being advised about it. 
At the same time, even though the article makes allowance for other sources of financing, we 
note that the state governments' borrowings consist mainly of loans from the federal government 
(up to 95%). Therefore as far as their borrowing activities are concerned, we can see that the state 
governments are highly dependant on the federal government. This situation originates probably 
from the fact that most of the state governments are too small to venture into the capital market. It 
can also be explained by the fact that the capital market is not developed enough and is not yet 
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ready to welcome a new player. As for the rest 5% of the financing, it comes mainly from the 
local financial institutions.  
 
It is also clear from the Article that regarding the application of the regulation, no exception is 
made for any particular state. The rule is applied with the same intensity to all states. However 
the fact that the borrowing limitation is similar for all states makes it impossible for us to adopt 
the same methodology as the one employed by most studies where the intensity and type of rules 
vary across time or geographical areas.  
 
We propose to adopt the approach normally used to study the intertemporal behaviors of an 
economic agent. We assume that the borrowing limitation imposed by the Constitution works like 
a liquidity constraint that inhibits the state governments from smoothing their consumption over 
time or in other word from observing a forward looking behavior implied by the permanent 
income hypothesis. Therefore, if the results of the estimation show that state governments 
observe a forward looking behavior, it means that the latter are not subject to any liquidity 
constraint and thus the borrowing limitation does not have any influence on their spending 
behavior. On the contrary, a non-forward looking behavior does not necessarily mean that the 
borrowing limitation is effective for such eventuality can also be explained by the presence of 
precautionary saving
4
.  Nevertheless, in the case of the state governments in Malaysia, we may 
argue that it is quite unlikely for the latter to be the cause of any non-observation of the 
permanent income hypothesis and this essentially for three reasons.  
 
Firstly, if we look at the financial positions of the state governments as a whole for the period of 
1980-2003, as depicted by figure 1, we notice that most of the time, the revenues of state 
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governments were insufficient to finance their expenditures, resulting sometimes in a huge 
deficits (the highest deficit was recorded in 2001 where it stood at a whooping RM 3.745 billions 
(USD 1 billion). It is thus more probable for the state governments to draw into their savings in 
order to finance these deficits than to add into them.  The increase in state governments’ debts as 
depicted by figure 2 is another major consequence of these deficits. Furthermore, a recent report 
by the Auditor-General's Office revealed that most states have not been able to maintain their 
assets and their incomes have dwindled over the years. Consequently, as at 31/12/2003 a total 
amount of RM 2.55 billion (USD 580 millions) in arrears of debt service repayments are yet to be 
settled by the state governments to the federal government (see table 1).   
 
Secondly, consumers constitute precautionary saving in order to deal with uncertainty in their 
future income. With enough savings, consumers hope that they will be able to at least enjoy the 
same level of utility in case of unpredictable adverse events. There are thus two underlying 
conditions for the existence of precautionary saving - the uncertainty of future incomes and the 
risk averse behavior of the consumers. In the case of the Malaysian state governments, while it is 
plausible to assume that they are to a certain extent risk-averse, the structure of their revenue is 
such that it is less likely for it to vary considerably in an unpredictable manner. In fact, the tax 
base of the state governments is very small. All direct taxes are collected by the Federal 
government and state governments are assigned residual revenues such as those related to land, 
real property, agriculture and forestry. As for other sources of revenue, they come mainly from 
non-tax revenues (such as licenses and permits, commercial undertakings and service fees) as 
well as transfers and grants from the federal government. Most of the sources of these revenues 
are clearly sheltered from unpredictable shocks
5
 and as a consequence, state governments may 
not consider it as necessary, the constitution of precautionary saving. 
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Finally and more importantly, the main reason that pushes us to believe in the absence of 
motivation for precautionary savings by the state governments is the existence, as stated in 
Article 109(6) of the Construction, of the State Reserve Fund.  The latter which is totally funded 
by the central government
6
 is designed in order to provide two types of grants to state 
governments: those to assist states which have deficits in their current accounts and those to 
assist states with development expenditure based on the level of economic development, 
infrastructure and quality of life. The payment of these grants is however subject to review by a 
special committee of the Finance National Council
7
 to ensure that adequate efforts have been 
made by the state governments to meet shortfalls from their resources. With the existence of this 
"emergency" fund, it is quite plausible to assume the absence of precautionary saving motive 
among Malaysian state governments. 
 
Together, these evidences suggest that as far as the Malaysian state governments are concerned, a 
deviation from the permanent income hypothesis is more likely to be explained by the existence 
of liquidity constraint than by the presence of precautionary saving motive. In other words, we 
believe that any potential non-forward looking behavior by the state governments in Malaysia is 
due more to their excess sensitivity to current income variation than to their lack of reaction to 
unpredictable income innovation.  
 
Theoretical framework 
In the intertemporal approaches to decision making, it is assumed that agents are forward looking 
which implies that decisions regarding today's consumption are made on the basis of expectations 
about future resources. This model of intertemporal consumption behavior by private households 
uses as benchmark the permanent-income hypothesis. Testable empirical implications of the 
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permanent-income hypothesis were developed in a seminal paper by Hall (1978). The first 
application of the notion of intertemporal decision making to the state and local governments' 
spending behavior was done by Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1989). It is their framework that will be 
adopted for the present case. 
 
We first assume the existence of a decision maker representing the state governments whose goal 
is to maximize the expected present value of utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. 
The utility function depends upon the flow of government services measured here by current 
expenditures. If we denote the period-specific utility function for state i by  .iU , then the 
maximization programme can be expressed as follows 
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where tE  denotes expectations taken using information available through the end of period t, 
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1
 and   is the pure rate of time preference, and itG  is the level of state government i 
spending on nondurable goods and services in period t. An attractive feature of this model is that 
it does not require us to specify whose preferences are represented by  .U . It might as well depict 
that of a bureaucrat of state government or that of a representative resident. We only need to 
assume that the decision maker has a stable preference.   
 
Furthermore, the state government i decision-maker is subject to the following intertemporal 
budget constraint  
 13 
 
  0
0
1  


  sitsit
s
s
it GRW        (2)  
 
where itW  is state government i wealth at period t, itR  resources available to state government i 
at period t and 
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  and r is the constant real rate of interest. itR  Is considered to be 
exogenous. This budget constraint states that the initial wealth plus the present value of resources 
must at least cover the present value of expenditures.  
 
The resolution of the above maximization problem will yield the optimal spending path of the 
state government i which is characterized by the system of Euler equations 
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According to equation (3), the marginal rate of substitution between state government 
expenditure in adjacent period is equated to the intertemporal relative prices. After some 
manipulation, equation (3) can be transformed into the following ex post relationship  
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where t  represents an expectational error term and, assuming that expectations are formed 
rationally; 
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A direct implication of equation (4) is that the state government expenditure is a martingale. 
There are in effect several assumptions which are embedded in the above model. It first assumes 
that the state government spending decisions are derived from the maximization of the discounted 
value of a time-separable objective function. Secondly, it assumes that the state government is 
not facing any credit market rationing. Finally, the model assumes rationally formed 
expectations. It is the second assumption that we're interested in. Since state governments in 
Malaysia are facing credit market constraints, we presume that the model will be invalidated if it 
is to be confronted with the Malaysian data.  
 
In practice and under certain assumptions, the permanent-income hypothesis, applied here to the 
state and local governments' spending, can be tested by estimating an equation of the form 
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where   parameters to be estimated and t  a random error term
8
. If  are found to be 
significantly different from zero, we can reject the permanent income hypothesis.  
 
One disadvantage of this approach is that the results may be difficult to interpret since the 
permanent-income hypothesis is not tested against any specific alternative. A non-zero i  does 
not necessarily reflect a total rejection of the permanent income hypothesis as it is possible that 
only, say 20% of spending produces the rejection while the other 80% are well determined in 
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accordance with the permanent income model. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) proposed an 
alternative test that allows one to measure the quantitative significance of the rejection. This test 
assumes that there's a fraction   of state governments' expenditures that is determined by current 
resources so that another 1-  will follow the permanent income hypothesis. The so-called '  
model' is given by the following equation: 
 
    ititit RG   11ln      (7) 
 
The key parameter in equation (7), and the parameter to be estimated in the empirical analysis, 
is . If   is strictly positive, the consumption path is affected by expected fluctuations in 
income, and the permanent-income hypothesis is rejected. In this case, we presume that the state 
governments' expenditures are to a certain extent influenced by the borrowing limitations. Again 
it is important to emphasize that as indicated in the previous section, the precautionary saving 
motive is assumed to be absent. Thus any deviation from the permanent income hypothesis is due 
to the existence of liquidity constraint.      
 
On the other hand, if   equals zero, expected fluctuations in income will disappear from the 
consumption path. Consistent with the permanent-income hypothesis, consumers are perfectly 
able to smooth spending over time. In term of borrowing limitation, this result signifies that the 
control has been ineffective and has no effect whatsoever on the spending behavior of the state 
governments. An advantage with the ' -model' is that it does not only facilitate a test of the 
permanent-income hypothesis. If the permanent-income hypothesis is rejected, it also provides 
information about how 'serious' the rejection is: the higher the value of , the more weight is put 
on expected fluctuations in income and the more “serious” is the rejection. This finding can be 
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used in order to determine whether the liquidity constraint has a role in influencing the 
subnational behavior or not. Assuming that the “rich” states will be less affected by the liquidity 
constraint, the rejection of the permanent income hypothesis for this group should be at a lower 
degree than the one observed for the group of “poor” states. In other words, we may assume that 
liquidity constraint is at play if the behavior of the “poor” states differs significantly from the 
“rich” states. Again, such a conclusion is possible uniquely in the case where precautionary 
saving motive is, for valid reasons, assumed to be absent. 
 
Data and Empirical Specification. 
Data. 
The study is based on the expenditures and revenues data of the 13 states in Malaysia from 1980 
to 2003 obtained from the Financial Statements produced yearly by each state government. 
Concurrently with the theoretical consideration
9
, we only consider the spending on non-durables 
good and services. We do not have data on non-durable spending, so we have to use the current 
expenditure bearing in mind that it may include some spending on durables. The revenue of the 
state governments consist of taxes, licenses, user charges, commercial undertakings as well as 
grants from the federal government. Expenditures and revenue data are measured in real per 
capita terms using the consumer price index as deflator. We use three different price indexes: one 
for all the states of the Peninsular Malaysia, one for the state of Sabah and one for the state of 
Sarawak.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the average growth of revenues and expenditures for all states for the period 
1980-1990 and 1990-2000. We note that for the first period, all states have experienced a positive 
growth of their revenue and expenditures.  We also note that for most states, their revenue seems 
 17 
to grow faster than their expenditures.  In the second period, we note that not only the growth for 
both the revenue and the expenditure have turned negative for certain states, but for those who 
experienced positive growth the hike is much lower as compared to the one in the first period. In 
total, for the period of 1990-2000, the average growth of expenditures and revenue for all states 
are 2.68% and 1.62% respectively (as compared to 6.10% and 7.53% in the first period).  The 
radical change in the evolution of the revenue and the expenditures of the state governments 
between the 2 periods is not a surprise as it is the reflection of the growing centralization of the 
country. This point is illustrated by the acceleration of the growth of expenditures of the federal 
government in the second period.  
 
Empirical Specification. 
The empirical counterpart of equation (7) can be written as follows: 
itititt RfG   ln        (8) 
 
where itG  and itR   represent, respectively, spending and revenues of state government i in year t. 
The time specific constant t  captures the real interest rate and other macroeconomic variables 
that are common to all state governments. if  Is a state specific effect that captures any 
differences in time preferences across the state governments. The state-fixed effect can be 
removed by differencing equation (8) and we arrive at the following equation,  
 
itittit RG  
22 ln      (9) 
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In the above equation, the error term ( it ) can be interpreted as the revision in the decision 
maker's forecast of future resources. However, it is very likely that this revision of future 
resources will be linked to the growth of current resources ( itR ) and this correlation will carry 
over to it  and itR
2 . Hence the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) will no longer be 
appropriate to estimate equation (8). Consequently, we will apply the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method suggests that if the 
error term is serially uncorrelated, lagged values of spending and revenue, dated t-2 and back, can 
be used as valid instruments. As for the number of lags to be used as instruments in our study, we 
will select the most parsimonious set of instruments consistent with the data.  
 
There are two types of GMM estimators: (1) the difference estimator and (2) the system 
estimator. A problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged levels are often 
poor instruments for first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) described how, if the original 
equations are added to the differenced system, additional moment conditions can be brought to 
bear to increase efficiency. In these equations, predetermined and endogenous variables in levels 
are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences. In what follows, we present 
results using the “system GMM” estimator. We will compare the system GMM results with those 
of the less efficient difference GMM estimator as well as with those of OLS estimator which 
treats the endogenous variables and their lags as exogenous. 
 
Results. 
We start by estimating the above equation using the OLS method. As indicated by column (1) of 
table 3, we find that the permanent income hypothesis can be rejected as    is significantly 
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different from 0. Similarly, one can reject the hypothesis that the data are consistent with the 
Keynesian model i.e.   = 1. Thus the spending behavior of the state governments is governed by 
both the permanent income hypothesis and the Keynesian model. We note however that a 
substantial share (85%) of state government spending is determined by intertemporal 
optimization. As stressed in the section above, OLS may not be an appropriate estimation method 
because there's a potential endogeneity problem with the regressor. Therefore, we reestimate the 
equation using the GMM method. Here, we set the maximum number of instruments used to 13
10
. 
In table 2, our primary result is given by column (3) where we use the “system” GMM estimator. 
In column (2) the “difference” GMM estimator is used.  
 
Our estimation results shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the value of      equals 
zero. On this basis, one cannot reject the permanent income hypothesis. The state governments 
spending are completely determined by intertemporal optimization. The joint hypothesis of 
correct model specification and valid instruments cannot be rejected and while the disturbances 
exhibit negative first-order serial correlation, there are no sign of second-order serial correlation. 
It is interesting to notify that the value of    decreases when we use the GMM method instead 
the OLS. This signifies that the correlation between the growth of current resources ( itR ) and 
the innovation in the permanent resources ( it ) is positive. This result is consistent with the one 
found in the literature
11
 and signifies that part of the growth in the current resources is anticipated 
to be permanent.  
 
In term of borrowing limitation, the fact that the state governments' current expenditures are not 
determined by current resources indicates that the latter are not facing any liquidity constraint. In 
other words, the borrowing limitation imposed on the state governments does not have any effect 
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on their spending behaviors. They are capable of smoothing completely their consumption in 
spite of this institutional constraint. These results also comforted our belief in the absence of 
precautionary saving constitution by the state governments. 
 
The effect of borrowing limitation on the spending behavior of state governments may also be 
influenced by the latter's level of income.  It is possible that the limitation is having an effect only 
on states with a certain level of income. In other words, we assume that for state governments 
with a relatively high level of income, their expenditures are less likely to be affected by 
institutional rule.  We test for this by splitting our sample into 2 groups according to their level of 
income. Following Zeldes (1985) and Shea (1995), we use the average values of real per capita 
revenues during the period under study to determine the 2 groups. If there were to be any 
liquidity constraint, than it is more likely the states with a lower income that will be affected by 
it. We should thus observe a less forward looking behavior among this group as compared to the 
one with a higher income. 
 
The results of the estimation are reported in table 4. Our results indicate that, in our preferred 
specification (column (5) and (6)), the level of income doesn't seem to have any influence on the 
effect of the institutional limitation. For both groups, state governments' pending behavior is 
found to be unaffected by the borrowing limitation. For the high income group, our estimation 
results varied according to the estimation method used. When the GMM in difference is 
employed, we found that the growth of consumption is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the growth in income. However, when we use the GMM system, the correlation becomes 
non significant. We take this result as a sign that the GMM system is a more efficient method of 
estimation than the GMM in difference. We also take into account the fact that the results of the 
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estimations may be sensitive to the instruments being used by varying the set of instruments 
employed. However we found the results not to vary that much from the ones in our original 
specifications and all of them seem to point to the same conclusion. 
 
The results of our estimations showed that the borrowing restriction imposed on the state 
governments have not been effective in curbing their spending behavior. The regulation provides 
an avenue for the federal government to control subnational governments’ spending behavior.  
Therefore, its impact will mostly (if not totally) depend on the motivation as well as the capacity 
of the federal government to implement it. Does federal government really have the incentives to 
restrict subnational governments’ borrowing? If it does, does it have the capacity to do so?  
 
Given the actual repartition of powers and responsibilities between different levels of 
governments, the federal government may not consider it as necessary to exert a strict control on 
the state governments spending behavior. As the state governments’ responsibilities are quite 
limited, the federal government may believe that their expenditures will stay within a certain 
acceptable limit and will not pose any great danger to the stability of the economy as a whole. As 
a result, the federal government may not be as stringent as it should normally be in approving 
loans applications by state governments. However, we believe that with the growing incapacity of 
the state governments in honoring their debts, the federal government may become more vigilant 
in the future. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the borrowing limitations may also be the reflection of the central 
government willingness not to further burden state governments financial needs by restricting 
their access to loans. With most of the revenue sources being devolved to the federal government, 
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state governments’ financial resources are far from sufficient to cover their expenditures, creating 
a financial gap which is normally filled through federal transfers (grants and loans). At the same 
time, statistics showed that there’s a net tendency for federal government to shift its financial 
allocation to state governments from grants to loans over time. Federal government grants to the 
states decreased from 9.0 per cent of its operating budget in 1975 to 3.5 per cent in 1999. 
Meanwhile, outstanding loans from the federal government to the state governments increased 
from RM1107 million to over RM9000 million. In other words, state governments’ easy access to 
borrowing may simply be the result of the federal government relying more and more heavily on 
loans to cover the financial needs of the states government.  
 
The fact that state governments can have some degree of political leverage over the decision-
making of the central government can also help explain why they are not constrained in their 
spending behavior. Even though, it is up to the central government to decide whether to grant a 
loan or not, state government can use its representatives both at the legislature and the executive 
to tilt the decisions in its favor. While there is as yet no empirical proof as to the relation between 
political representations and the amount of loans accorded to subnational governments in 
Malaysia, anecdotal evidence suggests that elected politicians tend to reward their constituencies. 
Besides, since the whole process concerning loans applications and approval are usually kept 
away from public scrutiny, it is quite plausible to believe that economical and financial merits are 
not the sole determinant factors for state governments to secure a loan.  
 
To summarize, the way responsibilities and powers are divided across levels of governments in 
Malaysia has to a certain extent rendered the federal government less “motivated” in regulating 
subnational governments’ borrowing. In addition, the political leverage possessed by the 
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subnational government on the decision-making of the central government make it even harder 
for the latter to properly enforce the regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to assess the effectiveness of the control mechanism designed to curb 
the incentives for fiscal indiscipline among subnational governments in Malaysia. The objective 
is to examine whether a decision to further decentralize the economy in the future will not be 
translated into macroeconomic instability due to the tendency for fiscal profligacy of the state 
governments. Indeed such eventuality can be avoided if the federal government has what it takes 
in order to put the spending behavior of the state governments under control.  
 
However, the nature of the borrowing limitation in Malaysia (invariant across all 13 states) makes 
it impossible for us to adopt the methodology usually found in the literature. Consequently, we 
applied the methodology normally employed in the study of intertemporal behavior or more 
precisely, the one suggested by Campbell and Mankiw (1990). This method allowed us to 
examine the extent to which intertemporal considerations play a role in determining the spending 
behaviors of the state governments. 
 
We regarded the borrowing limitation imposed by the Federal Constitution as similar to a 
liquidity constraint facing the state governments. We assumed that if this limitation were to have 
an impact on the state governments, we should not observe a complete forward looking behavior 
by the latter. We also argued that at the state governments’ level, the precautionary saving motive 
can be assumed to be absent. Thus, any potential deviation from the implication of the permanent 
income hypothesis is mainly due to the presence of liquidity constraint.  
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Our estimation results show that the spending behavior of the state governments in Malaysia is 
completely governed by the permanent income hypothesis. We also find some evidence that 
regardless of their income level, states governments manage to completely smooth their current 
expenditures. Taken together, these results suggest that the borrowing limitations imposed on the 
state governments do not have any impact whatsoever on the spending behavior of the state 
governments in Malaysia. The institutional rule can thus be considered as a mere veil that can 
easily be pierced down.  
 
The finding of this study implies that the federal government in Malaysia has not succeeded in 
putting the spending of the state governments in check. It also implies that the borrowing 
limitation, clearly etched in the Federal Constitution is taken for granted by both the federal and 
states governments. Given the actual level of decentralization in Malaysia in terms of spending 
and taxation power of the state governments, these results did not really take us by surprise. The 
central government realizing that the state governments do not have much powers, does not see it 
as necessary to really control the latter's spending behavior and thus is very laxist in the 
application of the Article 111(2). Besides, the facts that state governments rely more and more 
heavily on loans to cover their expenditures make it difficult for the federal government to be too 
strict in approving their loans application. Finally, we believe that there’s a lack of objectivity in 
the decision making of the federal government due to the political influences exerted by the state 
governments through their representatives at the legislature and the executive. Consequently, 
should the Malaysian government decide to embark on any decentralization process, it is 
imperative for a new and more stringent control mechanism to be introduced. If the central 
government were to content itself with the same rule (and at the same degree of application), 
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there's a chance that further decentralization of the economy will be translated into an increase in 
irresponsible spending by the state governments with all the effects that it can have on the 
macroeconomic stability of the country.  
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End notes 
1. See Jomo and Wee (2002) for a discussion on the conflictual relation between state and federal governments in 
Malaysia. 
 
2. The no-bailout commitment problem of the central government can also be explained through a simple dynamic 
games of incomplete information between the central and subnational governments as proposed by Rodden (2005) 
 
3. A different approach was proposed by Alesina and Perotti(1996) who distinguish three types of "rules and 
regulations" (1) numerical targets on the budget such as a balanced-budget rule (2) procedural rules (such as voting 
rules) that regulate the preparation and legislative approval of the budget and (3) rules regarding the transperancy of 
the budget 
 
4. Several attempts have been made in order to discriminate between these two effects but to no avail. According to 
Caroll and Kimball (2001), these attempts are bound to fail for both the precautionary saving and the liquidity 
constraint are derived from the concavity of the consumption function. In fact, precautionary saving and liquidity 
constraint are related to two different phenomenons that lead to the same deviation from the implication of 
permanent income. These two phenomenons are; excess smoothness to income innovation which can be explained 
by the existence of precautionary saving and excess sensitivity to expected income changes explained by the 
liquidity constraint effect.  
 
5. Such a situation is not limited to Malaysia. Indeed, in the literature concerning the assignment of revenue-raising 
responsibilities, there is broad consensus that taxes that are more sensitive to changes in income should be assigned 
to the central government. As such, the central government will have in its hand an instrument of stabilization and 
the subnational governments will have its budget sheltered from cyclical fluctuation. 
 
6. In the United States, it is the states themselves that constitute their own “Rainy Day” Fund. A generally accepeted 
rule of thumb in state government budgeting is that reserve should be equal to approximately 5 percent of the current 
budget.  
 27 
 
7. The National Finance Council consists of the Prime Minister, or his representative, and one representative of each 
of the states appointed by the Governor or the Ruler of the state. It is an important forum for the discussion of all 
matters of federal-state finance but its decisions are not binding; it is purely advisory. The Finance National Council 
has also set the maximum amount of disbursement to RM 170 million.  
  
8. The equation is exact if we assume that the decision maker's utility function displays a constant relative risk 
aversion. Otherwise, this equation should be considered as a first-order logarithmic approximation. 
 
9. In the utility maximization program, we assume that the utility is separable in time (Dynan (1992) Albaran (2002). 
Thus consumption in t-1 should not have any effect on the utility in period t. In order to avoid this, we will exclude 
consumption on durables from our specification.  
 
10. It is well documented that GMM estimators with too many overidentifying restrictions perform poorly in finite 
samples. As a rule of thumb, one should use fewer than N instruments, where N is the number of cross-sectional 
units (in our case N=13). 
 
11. See Dahlberg and Lindström (1998) Borge and Tovmo (2000) and Borge, Dalberg and Tovmo (2001) 
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Figure 1: State governments’ finance 1980-2003 
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Source: Malaysian State Governments Financial Statement, various issues. 
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Figure 2: State governments’ outstanding debts 1984-1999 
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Source: Malaysian State Government Financial Statement, various issues. 
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Table 1: Loans repayments and loan repayments arrears of the state governments 
 
State 
government 
Loan 
repayment 
arrears as at 
31/12/2002 
 
(RM Million) 
Year 2002 Loan 
repayment 
arrears not 
identified  
 
(RM Million) 
Loan 
repayment 
arrears as at 
31/12/2003 
 
(RM Million) 
Annuity 
payable 
 
 
(RM Million) 
Annuity 
paid  
 
 
(RM Million) 
Johor 506.64 66.42 4.68 - 568.38 
Kedah 488.48 71.54 11.72 67.33 615.63 
Kelantan 129.57 25.44 0.74 4.02 158.29 
Melaka 38.07 35.05 33.00 32.01 72.13 
N. Sembilan 36.34 65.49 22.17 - 79.66 
Pahang 244.99 93.86 2.44 19.35 355.76 
Perak 4.35 15.92 14.56 - 5.71 
Perlis 36.47 9.00 0.00 2.26 47.73 
Pulau Pinang 31.71 31.19 20.57 - 42.33 
Sabah 35.59 13.07 0.00 3.78 52.44 
Sarawak 41.26 129.87 113.87 1.48 58.74 
Selangor 178.62 94.56 0.58 1.89 274.49 
Trengganu 160.09 52.83 6.72 7.60 213.80 
Total 1932.18 704.24 231.05 139.72 2545.09 
 
Source: Auditor General’s Report 2003 
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Table 2: The evolution of state governments’ real revenue and expenditures (1980-
1990 and 1991-2001) (in %) 
 
 
1980-1990 1990-2000 
Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Revenue 
Johor 4,22 7,04 -1,83 -4,38 
Kedah 1,53 10,75 4,52 4,56 
Kelantan 6,12 10,09 3,23 3,36 
Melaka 7,50 8,29 1,53 4,89 
Negeri Sembilan 0,54 3,75 4,05 3,29 
Pahang 4,57 4,62 0,50 2,18 
Perak 2,91 7,18 4,15 2,36 
Perlis 9,43 8,59 0,49 -4,16 
Penang 7,18 7,35 5,80 2,68 
Sabah 3,90 0,20 -6,59 -1,80 
Sarawak 11,20 11,07 8,10 2,69 
Selangor 6,07 10,23 8,49 4,71 
Trengganu 14,13 8,79 2,40 0,68 
All states 6,10 7,53 2,68 1,62 
Federal. Gov 3.74 4.73 5,32 4,39 
 
Source: Malaysian State Governments Financial Statement, various issues. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for pooled sample (1980-2003) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
GMM 
 difference 
(4) 
GMM 
system 
  0.2866 *** 
(0.0605) 
0,0185  
(0.1193) 
-0.1161 
(0.1077) 
Constant -0.0003 
(0.0099) 
 0.0023 
(0.0076) 
R2 0.1522   
Sargan test   12.99 9.26 
No. of restriction  12 11 
Sargan p-value  0,370 0.598 
1st order AC  -3.30 -3.28 
2nd order AC  0.09 0.09 
Notes: t-test in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% level***. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for split sample (1980-2003) 
 OLS 
Low 
income 
OLS 
High 
Income 
GMM 
difference 
Low 
income 
GMM 
difference 
High 
income 
GMM  
system 
Low 
income 
GMM 
difference 
High 
income 
 0.3902*** 
(0.1097) 
0.2359*** 
(0.0602) 
0.022 
(0.3575) 
-0.4358** 
(0.1382) 
0.0665 
(0.3077) 
-0.2274 
(0.2245) 
Constant 0.0035 
(0.0120) 
-0.0053 
(-0.0140) 
  0.0060 
(0.0040) 
-0.0033 
(0.0177) 
R2 0.1920 0.1326     
Sargan test    6.80 5.45 3.35 3.80 
No. of 
restriction 
  6 5 5 4 
Sargan p-
value 
  0.340 0.363 0.647 0.434 
 
1st order 
AC 
  -2.23 -2.26 -2.18 -2.18 
2nd order 
AC 
  0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 
Notes: t-test in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% level***. 
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